Abstract
Introduction
Communication is intended to be used in a bidirectional matter, where sender and receiver exchange information without any hassle. The problem is that communication between two differently classified networks is submitted to strict security rules. Specifically rules regarding the declassification of information i.e. before it is allowed to leave the classified network. In classified environments Data Diodes are used to transport information from the unclassified network to the classified network securely. However, when information is declassified it is still transported manually using a media carrier like USB or CD to the unclassified network.
The disadvantage of manual transporting (declassified) information is that it' s not realtime, it's time consuming and it introduces additional security risks since information is transported in an uncontrolled matter (humans). In order to solve this problem, Unidirectional Security Gateway System was born.
This paper derives necessary security functions of a Unidirectional Security Gateway based on the Common Criteria v3.1 and intends to suggest how to improve the functionality of currently used privacy protection system. of the evaluation results between the countries that agrees on the idea. It permits comparability between the results of independent security evaluations by providing a common set of requirements for the security functionality of IT products and for assurance measures applied to these IT products during a security evaluation. Consumers, developers, and evaluators can use the CC. Consumers and developers can use it to enumerate and describe the security functions they need from a product [2] .
The CC is presented as a set of distinct but related parts as identified below [2] [3].
 Part 1: The part 1 is the introduction to the CC. It defines the general concepts and principles of IT security evaluation and presents a general model of evaluation [2] .
 Part 2: The part 2 establishes a set of security functional components that serve as standard templates upon which to base functional requirements for TOEs [3] . CC Part 2 catalogues the set of functional components and organizes them in families and classes [3] .
 Part 3: The part3 establishes a set of security assurance components that serve as standard templates upon which to base assurance requirements for TOEs. CC Part 3 catalogues the set of assurance components and organizes them into families and classes. Furthermore, CC Part 3 describes seven assurance package and evaluation criteria for PPs and STs.
To allow consumer groups and communities of interest to express their security needs, and to facilitate writing STs, the CC provides a special construct called Protection Profile (PP). Whereas an ST always describes a specific TOE, a PP is intended to describe a TOE type (e.g., firewalls). The same PP may therefore be used as a template for many different STs to be used in different evaluations. A PP must contain a PP introduction, conformance claim, security problem definition, security objectives, extended components definition, and security requirements. To see what kinds of security functions are needed to operate a Unidirectional Security Gateway, this paper intends to draw out security functional requirements for Unidirectional Security Gateway using the CC v3.1.
Unidirectional Security Gateway
A unidirectional network (also referred to as a unidirectional security gateway or data diode) is a network appliance or device allowing data to travel only in one direction, used in guaranteeing information security. They are most commonly found in high security environments such as defense, where they serve as connections between two or more networks of differing security classifications. This technology can now be found at the Industrial Control level for such facilities as nuclear power plants, and electric power generation [4].
Figure 2. Unidirectional Security Gateway
Unidirectional Security Gateway is installed between two separate networks. And it cuts off all communication data and relays the response/request data using data copy.
Security Problem Definition
The security problem definition is statement which in a formal manner defines the nature and scope of the security that the TOE is intended to address [1] [2] [3] .
This statement consists of a combination of:
Threats
This subsection of the security problem definition shows the threats that are to be countered by the Unidirectional Security Gateway. A threat consist of a threat agent, an asset and an adverse action of that threat agent on that asset [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . The specification of threats should include all threats detected up to now; if it is not done the Unidirectional Security Gateway may provide inadequate protection. In other words, if the specification of threats is insufficiency, the assets may be exposed to an unacceptable level of risk. The Threats for this paper are described in Table 1 [5] [6] [7] .
Table 1. Threats
Threat Description
T. Inflow of unauthorized traffic
Threat agents can attack the internal network zone as unauthorized traffic (e.g. malware, unauthorized information) flows in the Security Zone.
T.Outflow of data to the unauthorized Security Zone
Users in the Security Zone can take unauthorized data to the unauthorized Security Zone through networks.
T.User Impersonation Threat agents can access the Transmission Control Server as impersonating authorized users.
T.Administrator Impersonation Threat agents can access the Transmission Control Server as impersonating the authorized administrator.
T.FAILURE A failure in the TOE can cause the TSF data or user data to be modified by or exposed to a threat agent.
T.Continuous Authentication Attempt
Threat agents can get authentication of the authorized administrator as attempting authentication continuously to access the Transmission Control Server.
T.Reuse Attack
Threat agents can access the Transmission Control Server as reusing the administrator' s authentication data
T.Outflow and Damage of transmission data
Threat agents can flow out, change and delete transmitted data between elements of the product by unauthorized methods.
T.Damage of Storage data
Threat agents can flow out, change and delete important operating data stored in product by unauthorized methods.
OSP
An Organizational Security Policy (OSP) is a set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines imposed by an organization on the operational environment of the TOE. We identified Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) which are to be met by the security objectives in Table 2 [5] [6] [7] .
Table 2. Organizational Security Policy

Policies Description
P.Audit
The TOE must audit every auditable event and keep the audit record secure. This audit record is protected from unauthorized access.
P.Secure Management An authorized administrator shall manage the TOE, audit log, and so on in a secure way.
Assumption
The assumptions are made on the operational environment in order to be able to provide security functionality. If the TOE is placed in an operational environment that does not meet these assumptions, the TOE may not be able to provide all of its security functionality anymore. Assumptions can be on physical, personnel and connectivity of the operational environment. The Assumptions for this paper are described in Table 3 [5] [6] [7] .
Table 3. Assumption
Assumptions Description
A.Trusted Administrator It is assumed that the administrators are non-hostile, well trained and follow all administrator guidance.
A.Timestamp It is assumed that the TOE environment provides a secure timestamp that fulfills RFC 1305.
A.Physical Security The e-document issuing system is located in a physically secure environment that can only be accessed by an authorized administrator.
A.Secure Installation and Operation
The TOE will be distributed and installed on a user PC in a secure manner.
A.Network Any traffic flow required by the TOE services will always be allowed.
A.OS Enhancement
Services or means not required by the e-document issuing system will be removed from the operating system and vulnerabilities of the operating system will be fixed properly to ensure its reliability and stability.
Proposed Security Objective
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the problem defined by the security problem definition. The set of security objectives for a TOE form a high-level solution to the security problem. This high-level solution is divided into two partwise solutions: the security objectives for the TOE, and the security objectives for the TOE's operational environment. This section identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] .
Security Objectives for the TOE
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the problem defined by the security problem definition. The set of security objectives for a Unidirectional Security Gateway form a high-level solution to the security problem. Table II identifies the security objectives for the Unidirectional Security Gateway. The TOE will ensure that any data contained in a protected resource is not available when the resource is reallocated.
O.Unidirection
The Communication Request shall consist of a connect which is from the Transmission Control Server in the Security Zone to the Transmission Control Server in the Non-Security Zone and the Communication Request shall provide a function of One-direction Maintenance which does not permit any other Communication Requests.
O.Audit
The TOE shall generate and maintain a record of security-related events to ensure accountability. It shall provide a proper means to review the records. It shall also provide a function to deal with audit data storage exhaustion.
O.Management
The TOE shall provide its authorized administrator with a means to manage the TOE securely.
O.IA
The TOE shall uniquely identify a user and authenticate the user before allowing his access to the management functions and objects of the TOE. It shall have a countermeasure for consecutive authentication failures.
O.TSF Protection
The TOE shall protect itself from unauthorized access or tampering to its functionality and data in order to maintain the integrity of the system data and audit records. And The TOE will provide the capability to test some subset of its security functionality to ensure it is operating properly.
O.Stored DATA Protection
The TOE shall protect the user data and TSF data from unauthorized exposure, modification, or deletion.
O.Data Inspect
Before transmitting data from Non-Security Zone to Security Zone, a function shall be provided when malwares are not found after finishing a compulsory Malicious Code testing.
Security Objective for the Operational Environment
The operational environment of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality (which is defined by the security objectives for the TOE). This part wise solution is called the security objectives for the operational environment and consists of a set of statements describing the goals that the operational environment should achieve. The operational environments of the TOE for this paper are described in Table 5 . OE.Physical Security The e-document issuing system shall be located in a physically secure environment that can only be accessed by an authorized administrator.
OE.Secure Installation and Operation
The TOE shall be distributed and installed on a user PC in a secure manner.
OE.OS Enhancement
Services or means not required by the e-document issuing system shall be removed from the operating system and vulnerabilities of the operating system shall be fixed properly to ensure its reliability and stability.
OE.Network
Any traffic flow required by the TOE services shall always be allowed.
Security Objective Rationale
The Rationale proves that the requirements are specified completely. According to the rationale, it is possible to determine that security requirements are correct, complete and both protection profile author and potential developer can verify security of the proposed TOE. Table 6 describes the rationale. 
Conclusions
This paper proposes security requirements which can be used as a request for a proposal to procure a unidirectional Security Gateway, a guideline for developers to develop a unidirectional Security Gateway, and criteria with which evaluators can evaluate the completeness of a developed system. Thus, the unidirectional Security Gateway was analyzed, a threat was modeled, and CC based security requirements were deduced.
